Therefore we must speak also about particular justice and
particular and similarly about the just and the unjust. The justice,
then, which answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding
injustice, one being the exercise of virtue as a whole, and the
other that of vice as a whole, towards one's neighbour, we may leave
on one side. And how the meanings of 'just' and 'unjust' which
answer to these are to be distinguished is evident; for practically
the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are
prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole; for
the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids us to practise any
vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole
are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed
with a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the
education of the individual as such, which makes him without
qualification a good man, we must determine later whether this is
the function of the political art or of another; for perhaps it is not
the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at
random.
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of
honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among
those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is
possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that
of another), and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in
transactions between man and man.
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