g. if
the things are horses, the measure is 'horse', and if they are men,
'man'. If they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps
'living being', and the number of them will be a number of living
beings. If the things are 'man' and 'pale' and 'walking', these will
scarcely have a number, because all belong to a subject which is one
and the same in number, yet the number of these will be a number of
'kinds' or of some such term.
Those who treat the unequal as one thing, and the dyad as an
indefinite compound of great and small, say what is very far from
being probable or possible. For (a) these are modifications and
accidents, rather than substrata, of numbers and magnitudes-the many
and few of number, and the great and small of magnitude-like even
and odd, smooth and rough, straight and curved. Again, (b) apart
from this mistake, the great and the small, and so on, must be
relative to something; but what is relative is least of all things a
kind of entity or substance, and is posterior to quality and quantity;
and the relative is an accident of quantity, as was said, not its
matter, since something with a distinct nature of its own must serve
as matter both to the relative in general and to its parts and
kinds. For there is nothing either great or small, many or few, or, in
general, relative to something else, which without having a nature
of its own is many or few, great or small, or relative to something
else. A sign that the relative is least of all a substance and a
real thing is the fact that it alone has no proper generation or
destruction or movement, as in respect of quantity there is increase
and diminution, in respect of quality alteration, in respect of
place locomotion, in respect of substance simple generation and
destruction.
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