g. that 'plane figure' and the other
parts of the definition apply to the circle itself, but 'what really
is' has to be added, we must inquire whether this is not absolutely
meaningless. For to what is this to be added? To 'centre' or to
'plane' or to all the parts of the definition? For all the elements in
the essence are Ideas, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed'. Further,
there must be some Ideal answering to 'plane' above, some nature which
will be present in all the Forms as their genus.
5
Above all one might discuss the question what in the world the
Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are
eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be; for they
cause neither movement nor any change in them. But again they help
in no wise either towards the knowledge of other things (for they
are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in
them), or towards their being, if they are not in the individuals
which share in them; though if they were, they might be thought to
be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering
into its composition. But this argument, which was used first by
Anaxagoras, and later by Eudoxus in his discussion of difficulties and
by certain others, is very easily upset; for it is easy to collect
many and insuperable objections to such a view.
But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any
of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and
the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical
metaphors.
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