Therefore
it followed for them, almost by the same argument, that there must
be Ideas of all things that are spoken of universally, and it was
almost as if a man wished to count certain things, and while they were
few thought he would not be able to count them, but made more of
them and then counted them; for the Forms are, one may say, more
numerous than the particular sensible things, yet it was in seeking
the causes of these that they proceeded from them to the Forms. For to
each thing there answers an entity which has the same name and
exists apart from the substances, and so also in the case of all other
groups there is a one over many, whether these be of this world or
eternal.
Again, of the ways in which it is proved that the Forms exist,
none is convincing; for from some no inference necessarily follows,
and from some arise Forms even of things of which they think there are
no Forms. For according to the arguments from the sciences there
will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and according
to the argument of the 'one over many' there will be Forms even of
negations, and according to the argument that thought has an object
when the individual object has perished, there will be Forms of
perishable things; for we have an image of these. Again, of the most
accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which they say
there is no independent class, and others introduce the 'third man'.
And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy things for
whose existence the believers in Forms are more zealous than for the
existence of the Ideas; for it follows that not the dyad but number is
first, and that prior to number is the relative, and that this is
prior to the absolute-besides all the other points on which certain
people, by following out the opinions held about the Forms, came
into conflict with the principles of the theory.
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