Or
at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world,
then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then,
must be denied. And we have said how this must be done. Further, in
virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general
the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything;
nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes
them one. And those who say mathematical number is first and go on
to generate one kind of substance after another and give different
principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere
series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by
its existence or nonexistence), and they give us many governing
principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly.
'The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.'
Book XIII
1
WE have stated what is the substance of sensible things, dealing
in the treatise on physics with matter, and later with the substance
which has actual existence. Now since our inquiry is whether there
is or is not besides the sensible substances any which is immovable
and eternal, and, if there is, what it is, we must first consider what
is said by others, so that, if there is anything which they say
wrongly, we may not be liable to the same objections, while, if
there is any opinion common to them and us, we shall have no private
grievance against ourselves on that account; for one must be content
to state some points better than one's predecessors, and others no
worse.
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