those which are predicated; but an element is prior
to the things of which it is an element. But again (b) substance is
not an element in relative terms, nor is any of these an element in
substance. Further, (2) how can all things have the same elements? For
none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of
elements, e.g. b or a cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of
the intelligibles, e.g. being or unity, is an element; for these are
predicable of each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements,
then, will be either a substance or a relative term; but it must be
one or other. All things, then, have not the same elements.
Or, as we are wont to put it, in a sense they have and in a
sense they have not; e.g. perhaps the elements of perceptible bodies
are, as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the
privation; and, as matter, that which directly and of itself
potentially has these attributes; and substances comprise both these
and the things composed of these, of which these are the principles,
or any unity which is produced out of the hot and the cold, e.g. flesh
or bone; for the product must be different from the elements. These
things then have the same elements and principles (though specifically
different things have specifically different elements); but all things
have not the same elements in this sense, but only analogically;
i.e. one might say that there are three principles-the form, the
privation, and the matter.
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