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Aristotle

"Metaphysics"

Further, there
must be a matter underlying that which comes to be and changes. What
will this be, then,-what is it that becomes movement or becoming, as
body or soul is that which suffers alteration? And; again, what is
it that they move into? For it must be the movement or becoming of
something from something into something. How, then, can this condition
be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning, and therefore no
becoming of becoming. Since there is not movement either of
substance or of relation or of activity and passivity, it remains that
movement is in respect of quality and quantity and place; for each
of these admits of contrariety. By quality I mean not that which is in
the substance (for even the differentia is a quality), but the passive
quality, in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or to be
incapable of being acted on. The immobile is either that which is
wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is moved with
difficulty in a long time or begins slowly, or that which is of a
nature to be moved and can be moved but is not moved when and where
and as it would naturally be moved. This alone among immobiles I
describe as being at rest; for rest is contrary to movement, so that
it must be a privation in that which is receptive of movement.
Things which are in one proximate place are together in place, and
things which are in different places are apart: things whose
extremes are together touch: that at which a changing thing, if it
changes continuously according to its nature, naturally arrives before
it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing, is between.


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