Further, if there is movement, there is also something moved,
and everything is moved out of something and into something; it
follows that that that which is moved must first be in that out of
which it is to be moved, and then not be in it, and move into the
other and come to be in it, and that the contradictory statements
are not true at the same time, as these thinkers assert they are.
And if the things of this earth continuously flow and move in
respect of quantity-if one were to suppose this, although it is not
true-why should they not endure in respect of quality? For the
assertion of contradictory statements about the same thing seems to
have arisen largely from the belief that the quantity of bodies does
not endure, which, our opponents hold, justifies them in saying that
the same thing both is and is not four cubits long. But essence
depends on quality, and this is of determinate nature, though quantity
is of indeterminate.
Further, when the doctor orders people to take some particular
food, why do they take it? In what respect is 'this is bread' truer
than 'this is not bread'? And so it would make no difference whether
one ate or not. But as a matter of fact they take the food which is
ordered, assuming that they know the truth about it and that it is
bread. Yet they should not, if there were no fixed constant nature
in sensible things, but all natures moved and flowed for ever.
Again, if we are always changing and never remain the same, what
wonder is it if to us, as to the sick, things never appear the same?
(For to them also, because they are not in the same condition as
when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear alike; yet,
for all that, the sensible things themselves need not share in any
change, though they produce different, and not identical, sensations
in the sick.
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