One might discuss the question whether the science we are
seeking should be said to deal with the principles which are by some
called elements; all men suppose these to be present in composite
things. But it might be thought that the science we seek should
treat rather of universals; for every definition and every science
is of universals and not of infimae species, so that as far as this
goes it would deal with the highest genera. These would turn out to be
being and unity; for these might most of all be supposed to contain
all things that are, and to be most like principles because they are
by nature; for if they perish all other things are destroyed with
them; for everything is and is one. But inasmuch as, if one is to
suppose them to be genera, they must be predicable of their
differentiae, and no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae,
in this way it would seem that we should not make them genera nor
principles. Further, if the simpler is more of a principle than the
less simple, and the ultimate members of the genus are simpler than
the genera (for they are indivisible, but the genera are divided
into many and differing species), the species might seem to be the
principles, rather than the genera. But inasmuch as the species are
involved in the destruction of the genera, the genera are more like
principles; for that which involves another in its destruction is a
principle of it. These and others of the kind are the subjects that
involve difficulties.
2
Further, must we suppose something apart from individual things,
or is it these that the science we are seeking treats of? But these
are infinite in number.
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