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Aristotle

"Metaphysics"


The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small but is
naturally fitted to be either great or small; and it is opposed to
both as a privative negation (and therefore is also intermediate). And
that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but has no
name; for each of these has several meanings and the recipient subject
is not one; but that which is neither white nor black has more claim
to unity. Yet even this has not one name, though the colours of
which this negation is privatively predicated are in a way limited;
for they must be either grey or yellow or something else of the
kind. Therefore it is an incorrect criticism that is passed by those
who think that all such phrases are used in the same way, so that that
which is neither a shoe nor a hand would be intermediate between a
shoe and a hand, since that which is neither good nor bad is
intermediate between the good and the bad-as if there must be an
intermediate in all cases. But this does not necessarily follow. For
the one phrase is a joint denial of opposites between which there is
an intermediate and a certain natural interval; but between the
other two there is no 'difference'; for the things, the denials of
which are combined, belong to different classes, so that the
substratum is not one.
6
We might raise similar questions about the one and the many. For
if the many are absolutely opposed to the one, certain impossible
results follow. One will then be few, whether few be treated here as
singular or plural; for the many are opposed also to the few.


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