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Aristotle

"Metaphysics"

Therefore it is like asking
what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing's being one;
for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are
somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is
something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And
all things which have no matter are without qualification
essentially unities.
Book IX
1
WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the
other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in
virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to
be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve
the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work.
And since 'being' is in one way divided into individual thing,
quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in
respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now
add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us
explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the
most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality
extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when
we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of
actuality' explain the other kinds of potency as well.
We have pointed out elsewhere that 'potency' and the word 'can'
have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that
are so called by an equivocation.


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