g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere,
and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again
less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now
healthy and again diseased; and similarly in respect of substance
there is something that is now being generated and again being
destroyed, and now underlies the process as a 'this' and again
underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character. And in
this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the
others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has
matter for change of place that it should also have matter for
generation and destruction.
The difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming
in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.
2
Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is
generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it
remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of
actuality, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there are
three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the
matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e.
shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e.
order. But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some
things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter,
e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by
being bound together, e.
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