But we can inquire why man is
an animal of such and such a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are
not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then,
why something is predicable of something (that it is predicable must
be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). E.g.
why does it thunder? This is the same as 'why is sound produced in the
clouds?' Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of
another. And why are these things, i.e. bricks and stones, a house?
Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak
abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e.g. perhaps in the
case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for
this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the
case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case
of being also.
The object of the inquiry is most easily overlooked where one term
is not expressly predicated of another (e.g. when we inquire 'what man
is'), because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely that
certain elements make up a certain whole. But we must articulate our
meaning before we begin to inquire; if not, the inquiry is on the
border-line between being a search for something and a search for
nothing. Since we must have the existence of the thing as something
given, clearly the question is why the matter is some definite
thing; e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was
the essence of a house is present.
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