And in general it follows, if man
and such things are substance, that none of the elements in their
formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from
the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no
'animal' exists apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does
any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart.
If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain
that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also
from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this', but
rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the
'third man'.
The conclusion is evident also from the following consideration. A
substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete
reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in
complete reality one, though if they are potentially two, they can
be one (e.g. the double line consists of two halves-potentially; for
the complete realization of the halves divides them from one another);
therefore if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances
present in it and present in this way, which Democritus describes
rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of
one; for he identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes.
It is clear therefore that the same will hold good of number, if
number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some; for two is
either not one, or there is no unit present in it in complete reality.
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