). But if these also
are definable, either it is in some other way or, as we definition and
essence must be said to have more than one sense. Therefore in one
sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will have an essence,
except substances, but in another sense other things will have them.
Clearly, then, definition is the formula of the essence, and essence
belongs to substances either alone or chiefly and primarily and in the
unqualified sense.
6
We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or
different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance;
for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance,
and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.
Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally
thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be
different from the essence of white man. For if they are the same, the
essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for a man
and a white man are the same thing, as people say, so that the essence
of white man and that of man would be also the same. But perhaps it
does not follow that the essence of accidental unities should be the
same as that of the simple terms. For the extreme terms are not in the
same way identical with the middle term. But perhaps this might be
thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should
turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of
musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case.
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