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Aristotle

"Metaphysics"

And such
attributes are those in which is involved either the formula or the
name of the subject of the particular attribute, and which cannot be
explained without this; e.g. white can be explained apart from man,
but not female apart from animal. Therefore there is either no essence
and definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in
another sense, as we have said.
But there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose
and concave nose are the same thing, snub and concave will be the
thing; but if snub and concave are not the same (because it is
impossible to speak of snubness apart from the thing of which it is an
attribute propter se, for snubness is concavity-in-a-nose), either
it is impossible to say 'snub nose' or the same thing will have been
said twice, concave-nose nose; for snub nose will be concave-nose
nose. And so it is absurd that such things should have an essence;
if they have, there will be an infinite regress; for in snub-nose nose
yet another 'nose' will be involved.
Clearly, then, only substance is definable. For if the other
categories also are definable, it must be by addition of a
determinant, e.g. the qualitative is defined thus, and so is the
odd, for it cannot be defined apart from number; nor can female be
defined apart from animal. (When I say 'by addition' I mean the
expressions in which it turns out that we are saying the same thing
twice, as in these instances.) And if this is true, coupled terms
also, like 'odd number', will not be definable (but this escapes our
notice because our formulae are not accurate.


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