And all other things are said to be because they are,
some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense,
others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other
determination of it. And so one might even raise the question
whether the words 'to walk', 'to be healthy', 'to sit' imply that each
of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this
sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being
separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which
walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are
seen to be more real because there is something definite which
underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in
such a predicate; for we never use the word 'good' or 'sitting'
without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category
that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily,
i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be
substance.
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first;
yet substance is first in every sense-(1) in definition, (2) in
order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories
none can exist independently, but only substance. And (1) in
definition also this is first; for in the definition of each term
the definition of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we
know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man
is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its
quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also,
only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.
Pages:
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167