For in the case of things made
the principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art or some
faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer-viz. will,
for that which is done and that which is willed are the same.
Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or
theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will
theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about
substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from
matter. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the
essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle.
Of things defined, i.e. of 'whats', some are like 'snub', and some
like 'concave'. And these differ because 'snub' is bound up with
matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is
independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a
analogous to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh,
bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general,
plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to
movement-they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and
define the 'what' in the case of natural objects, and also that it
belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain
sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.
That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from
these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but
whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at
present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems
consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter.
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