In a sense there is one
account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but in a sense
there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself with an
attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical
Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in
a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he
claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper
to it,-one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to
be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there
could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not
only by the account of itself, but also by that of something else.
This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in
which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double
number by the use of the definition of two.
These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a
false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for
any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at
impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are
which produce a false appearance. This is why the proof in the Hippias
that the same man is false and true is misleading. For it assumes that
he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise);
and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false
result of induction-for a man who limps willingly is better than one
who does so unwillingly-by 'limping' Plato means 'mimicking a limp',
for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in
this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.
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