g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For 'animal'
is present in his definition; Callias is a particular animal.-(3)
Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of
its parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is
alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly
resides, is a part of the man.-(4) That which has no cause other
than itself; man has more than one cause--animal, two-footed--but
yet man is man in virtue of himself.-(5) Whatever attributes belong to
a thing alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue
of itself considered apart by itself.
19
'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts, in
respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for there must be
a certain position, as even the word 'disposition' shows.
20
'Having' means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and of what
he has-something like an action or movement. For when one thing
makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too
between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is
a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the
process will go on to infinity, if it is to be possible to have the
having of what we have.-(2) 'Having' or 'habit' means a disposition
according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill
disposed, and either in itself or with reference to something else;
e.
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