The term 'contrary' is applied (1) to those attributes differing
in genus which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2)
to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most
different of the attributes in the same recipient subject, (4) to
the most different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (5)
to the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or in
genus or in species. The other things that are called contrary are
so called, some because they possess contraries of the above kind,
some because they are receptive of such, some because they are
productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering
them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations,
of such. Since 'one' and 'being' have many senses, the other terms
which are derived from these, and therefore 'same', 'other', and
'contrary', must correspond, so that they must be different for each
category.
The term 'other in species' is applied to things which being of
the same genus are not subordinate the one to the other, or which
being in the same genus have a difference, or which have a contrariety
in their substance; and contraries are other than one another in
species (either all contraries or those which are so called in the
primary sense), and so are those things whose definitions differ in
the infima species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible in
genus, but their definitions are different), and those which being
in the same substance have a difference.
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