9
'The same' means (1) that which is the same in an accidental
sense, e.g. 'the pale' and 'the musical' are the same because they are
accidents of the same thing, and 'a man' and 'musical' because the one
is an accident of the other; and 'the musical' is 'a man' because it
is an accident of the man. (The complex entity is the same as either
of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it; for both
'the man' and 'the musical' are said to be the same as 'the musical
man', and this the same as they.) This is why all of these
statements are made not universally; for it is not true to say that
every man is the same as 'the musical' (for universal attributes
belong to things in virtue of their own nature, but accidents do not
belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the
individuals the statements are made without qualification. For
'Socrates' and 'musical Socrates' are thought to be the same; but
'Socrates' is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore
we do not say 'every Socrates' as we say 'every man'.
Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2)
are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is
one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one
either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are
said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the
being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated
as more than one, ie.
Pages:
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131