-Again, in
all classes in which the negation of an attribute involves the
assertion of its contrary, even in these there will be an
intermediate; for instance, in the sphere of numbers there will be
number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is
obvious from the definition.-Again, the process will go on ad
infinitum, and the number of realities will be not only half as
great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny
this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its
negation, and this new term will be some definite thing; for its
essence is something different.-Again, when a man, on being asked
whether a thing is white, says 'no', he has denied nothing except that
it is; and its not being is a negation.
Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical
opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical
arguments, they give in to the argument and agree that the
conclusion is true. This, then, is why some express this view;
others do so because they demand a reason for everything. And the
starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now
the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something;
for the form of words of which the word is a sign will be its
definition.-While the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are
and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that
there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems
to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is
neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is
true.
Pages:
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111