This is clear, in the first place, if we define
what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not,
or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that
it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says
of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is
true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said
to be or not to be.-Again, the intermediate between the
contradictories will be so either in the way in which grey is
between black and white, or as that which is neither man nor horse
is between man and horse. (a) If it were of the latter kind, it
could not change into the extremes (for change is from not-good to
good, or from good to not-good), but as a matter of fact when there is
an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes. For
there is no change except to opposites and to their intermediates. (b)
But if it is really intermediate, in this way too there would have
to be a change to white, which was not from not-white; but as it is,
this is never seen.-Again, every object of understanding or reason the
understanding either affirms or denies-this is obvious from the
definition-whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects in
one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true, and when it
does so in another way, what is false.-Again, there must be an
intermediate between all contradictories, if one is not arguing merely
for the sake of argument; so that it will be possible for a man to say
what is neither true nor untrue, and there will be a middle between
that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind
of change intermediate between generation and destruction.
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