And if this is so, it has been shown that contradictories
cannot be predicated at the same time.
Again, if all contradictory statements are true of the same
subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one. For the
same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man, if of everything it
is possible either to affirm or to deny anything (and this premiss
must be accepted by those who share the views of Protagoras). For if
any one thinks that the man is not a trireme, evidently he is not a
trireme; so that he also is a trireme, if, as they say,
contradictory statements are both true. And we thus get the doctrine
of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; so that nothing
really exists. They seem, then, to be speaking of the indeterminate,
and, while fancying themselves to be speaking of being, they are
speaking about non-being; for it is that which exists potentially
and not in complete reality that is indeterminate. But they must
predicate of every subject the affirmation or the negation of every
attribute. For it is absurd if of each subject its own negation is
to be predicable, while the negation of something else which cannot be
predicated of it is not to be predicable of it; for instance, if it is
true to say of a man that he is not a man, evidently it is also true
to say that he is either a trireme or not a trireme. If, then, the
affirmative can be predicated, the negative must be predicable too;
and if the affirmative is not predicable, the negative, at least, will
be more predicable than the negative of the subject itself.
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