And nearly all thinkers agree that being
and substance are composed of contraries; at least all name contraries
as their first principles-some name odd and even, some hot and cold,
some limit and the unlimited, some love and strife. And all the others
as well are evidently reducible to unity and plurality (this reduction
we must take for granted), and the principles stated by other thinkers
fall entirely under these as their genera. It is obvious then from
these considerations too that it belongs to one science to examine
being qua being. For all things are either contraries or composed of
contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all
contraries. And these belong to one science, whether they have or have
not one single meaning. Probably the truth is that they have not;
yet even if 'one' has several meanings, the other meanings will be
related to the primary meaning (and similarly in the case of the
contraries), even if being or unity is not a universal and the same in
every instance or is not separable from the particular instances (as
in fact it probably is not; the unity is in some cases that of
common reference, in some cases that of serial succession). And for
this reason it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is
contrariety or completeness or unity or being or the same or the
other, but only to presuppose these concepts and reason from this
starting-point.--Obviously then it is the work of one science to
examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua
being, and the same science will examine not only substances but
also their attributes, both those above named and the concepts 'prior'
and 'posterior', 'genus' and 'species', 'whole' and 'part', and the
others of this sort.
Pages:
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87