A similar view is expressed by those who make the elements more
than one; for these also must say that unity and being are precisely
all the things which they say are principles.
(A) If we do not suppose unity and being to be substances, it
follows that none of the other universals is a substance; for these
are most universal of all, and if there is no unity itself or
being-itself, there will scarcely be in any other case anything
apart from what are called the individuals. Further, if unity is not a
substance, evidently number also will not exist as an entity
separate from the individual things; for number is units, and the unit
is precisely a certain kind of one.
But (B) if there is a unity-itself and a being itself, unity and
being must be their substance; for it is not something else that is
predicated universally of the things that are and are one, but just
unity and being. But if there is to be a being-itself and a
unity-itself, there is much difficulty in seeing how there will be
anything else besides these,-I mean, how things will be more than
one in number. For what is different from being does not exist, so
that it necessarily follows, according to the argument of
Parmenides, that all things that are are one and this is being.
There are objections to both views. For whether unity is not a
substance or there is a unity-itself, number cannot be a substance. We
have already said why this result follows if unity is not a substance;
and if it is, the same difficulty arises as arose with regard to
being.
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