) According to this argument, then,
no one would be right who either says the first principle is any of
the elements other than fire, or supposes it to be denser than air but
rarer than water. But (2) if that which is later in generation is
prior in nature, and that which is concocted and compounded is later
in generation, the contrary of what we have been saying must be
true,-water must be prior to air, and earth to water.
So much, then, for those who posit one cause such as we mentioned;
but the same is true if one supposes more of these, as Empedocles says
matter of things is four bodies. For he too is confronted by
consequences some of which are the same as have been mentioned,
while others are peculiar to him. For we see these bodies produced
from one another, which implies that the same body does not always
remain fire or earth (we have spoken about this in our works on
nature); and regarding the cause of movement and the question
whether we must posit one or two, he must be thought to have spoken
neither correctly nor altogether plausibly. And in general, change
of quality is necessarily done away with for those who speak thus, for
on their view cold will not come from hot nor hot from cold. For if it
did there would be something that accepted the contraries
themselves, and there would be some one entity that became fire and
water, which Empedocles denies.
As regards Anaxagoras, if one were to suppose that he said there
were two elements, the supposition would accord thoroughly with an
argument which Anaxagoras himself did not state articulately, but
which he must have accepted if any one had led him on to it.
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